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The Political Biography As A Vehicle For The
Political Scientist: Dr. H.M. Hirschfeld and the
Dutch National Interest, 1931-1952.

John Rhijnsburger
University of Amsterdam*

"The dominant that guarantees the integrity
of the structure"
-Roman Jakobson.
Why should a political scientist want to write a political biography? Is it because the person in question is so fascinating, or is it
because the biography might teach us something more about
politics? I would argue for the latter. Should one come across an
enchanting person, all the better. But let it not be a prerequisite.
The biography I want to introduce serves as a means to
study a fundamental change in Dutch politics after the second
World War. The man at issue, a civil servant of major importance,
serves as the entry to the subject. He, or rather his signature, has
been my guide through the archives. The political-historical
analysis is interwoven with his life-story.
Fortunately Dr. Hans Max Hirschfeld (1899-1961) is a
fascinating and controversial person: fascinating because of the
various official positions he occupied, and controversial because
of the turn his career took during the German occupation of The
Netherlands. Dr. Hirschfeld had the capacity to transform complex political problems into relative simple policy choices. His
memos make society, and the Dutch economy in particular, more
transparent. As a top-official he saw political issues primarily as
practical managerial problems.
As for the positions he occupied: they may speak for
themselves. He was head of the Directorate for Trade and Industry
of the Department of Economics in the years of the Depression;
head of both the Departments of Economics and Agriculture dur*I am indebted to the participants in the ECPR Workshop
on Political Biography (Boch um, Germany, April 1990) for their
comments. I am particularly indebted to Meindert Fennema, Piet
de Rooy and Albert Kersten for their critical reading and to
William Lasser for his remarks and editorial directions.

133

ing the five years of German occupation; special adviser on
governmental policies toward Germany and The Netherlands
East Indies thereafter; the principal protagonist of Dutch policy
towards the Marshall plan; the main negotiator with Belgium in
molding the Benelux; a leading voice in the policy of rapid
industrialization during the late forties and early fifties; the first
Dutch ambassador (named High Commissioner) to the independent United States of Indonesia; and chairman of the so-called
Central Economic Commission (CEC) in the years 1951-2. The
CEC was and still is the most prominent civil servant advisory
board of the Dutch government. Before and after his career as a
public servant, Hirschfeld worked as a banker both in The Netherlands and in The Netherlands East Indies.
Hirschfeld was controversial because of his role during
the years of occupation (1940-45). With the government in exile
he became by his initiatives and strong personality the most
prominent Dutch civil servant under Nazi rule . Of all department
heads he was the only one to remain in his post until the very end
of the war. Others resigned, were fired, or went into hiding.
During the Nazi occupation Hirschfeld felt forced to make
a number of decisions that made him very unpopular with the
resistance movement. The Germans, however, put great trust in
him. They were well a ware of the fact that Hirschfeld was of great
importance to them as a mediator between Dutch and German
interests. They even went so far as to acquit him of his Jewish
descent. According to Nazi laws Hirschfeld should not have been
in the state apparatus at all. He himself also put a blind eye to the
German proclamation by which all officials with a Jewish background were ordered out of office.
What was the fate of a collaborator of Hirschfeld' s stature
after the war? Hirschfeld, who had already started to prepare his
defense in the last months of occupation, suspended his activities
at the moment of liberation to account for his war-time policies .
A few days later the Dutch military authorities, acting on behalf
of the Dutch government, also ordered him on leave. Hirschfeld
claimed that everything he had done had been in the Dutch
interest. But that of course is a controversial issue in itself. For
what is the Dutch interest? And who defines it? A commission of
inquiry concluded that Hirschfeld rightfully had raised this claim
but that he had made some serious mistakes . What he was blamed
for most was his total neglect of the Dutch resistance . His
dismissal was recommended.
The first Dutch postwar cabinet found it very difficult to
reach a decision on Hirschfeld. Some ministers really wanted to
get rid of him as soon as possible. Others thought it would be too
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great a loss, especially in view of the national economic reconstruction that lay ahead. Most hoped Hirschfeld would resign
voluntarily . When he did not, they discharged him, but with an
opportunity to appeal. He did so, and he won. The government
had to consider the matter all over again. In the meantime-it was
the summer of 1946--elections had taken place . A new CatholicLabor coalition govemmen t had taken its seat and the Department
of Economics had changed hands. Instead of a social-democrat,
it now was headed by a Catholic. Hirschfeld now primarily had
to deal with a staunch supporter of his wartime policies.
Nevertheless the ministerial discussion threatened to end
in a stalemate again. A solution could be found only when, in the
face of a political crisis, the socialist Minister of Agriculture,
Sicco Mansholt, gave in. The compromise implied that Hirschfeld
was allowed to resign with all the honors and compliments that
usually go therewith. But at the same time some severe points of
criticism were inserted in his certificate of discharge.
Hirschfeld, being a practical man, accepted the deal. On
January 1, 1947, he officially resigned. Six days later he was
appointed "Government Commissioner in General Service," a
position especially created for him. In his new position he was
expected to advise the government on policies towards Germany.
However, at that moment Hirschfeld had already become the main
architect of Dutch policies towards Germany, because even
before the cabinet had arranged for his resignation it had already
appointed him special adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
This dated from October 21, 1946, while the agreement on his
dismissal was not reached until November. So even before
Hirschfeld was allowed to leave the Dutch state-apparatus by the
front door, he had already been quietly pulled in again through a
specially created side door. Obviously the government was very
eager to make use of his vast experience once again.
Spectacular as Hirschfeld's resume may be, it should not
be enough for a political scientist. The political scientist, instead,
should ask: will this biography throw new light on politics in
general and on Dutch politics in particular? The latter seems
plausible, especially in the post-war years. As a government
commissioner in general service and particularly as a government
commissioner for the European Recovery Program, Hirschfeld
did not belong to any department. He was on the payroll of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, but he actually acted as a deputy
of the Ministerial Council of Economic Affairs (the Raad voor
Economische Aangelegenheden, or REA). This subcouncil of the
council of ministers at that time amounted to nothing less than a
core cabinet: all leading ministers had a seat in it. And a careful
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look was given to their party affiliation so as to reflect the overall
balance in party representation. By virtue of his position Hirschfeld
stood above and between the departments. He was their coordinating center. For lack of a formal coordinating principle-a
target of policy everybody could and did agree on-Hirschfeld
himself became the framework of policy. One might even say that
for a while he himself was performing the role of the Dutch
national interest as such.
We have now come to the question of what the biography
of Hirschfeld might do for a clarification of politics in general. To
answer this one cannot evade the question: what is politics? At this
level of inquiry, I think, politics should be defined as the struggle
for the definition of the national interest. National, here, means
Dutch and general alike: Dutch in so far as it means a strategy to
foster the nation's interest abroad, general as it stands for a
strategy that pretends to represent the interest of all citizens alike.
Above that the national interest also serves as the organizing
principle of the state-apparatus; that institution whose primary
function it is to uphold the national interest, that is, to defend and
represent the nation externally and to represent and cement
society internally.
The definition of the national interest has two sides: a
neutral, technical, or administrative one and a partisan, repressive,
or governing one. As a 'concept of control' it serves to regulate
and rule society. The definition of the national interest is a
strategic device to keep society intact together with the stateapparatus in which this particular task is concentrated. It shares
the ambiguity which is constitutive for politics in general and
which is so well expressed in the metaphor of the Janus-face of
politics. Here the Greek God with the two faces is brought
forward to show the essentially double-sidedness of politics : both
integrative and segregative. At one and the same time society is
seen here as an entity and as a diversity. By conceiving the
definition of the national interest as a concept of control, due
attention is given to this most difficult aspect of what politics is
about.
What I want the political biography of Hirschfeld to do is
to shed light on the change of concept of control that took place in
The Netherlands during the period 1931-52. The questions I want
to pose are: how does such a change occur? What are the roles of
the different institutions, nations, groupings and individuals involved? What is the essence of a concept of control? How does
it function? What or whom does it stand for? Of course it is not

136

my intention to give an answer to all these questions here. I merely
want to outline the project I am working on.

I
But first there is another question I have not yet dared to raise . Is
it possible at all to write a political biography? Is political
biography not a contradiction in terms? For people do not live in
politics by themselves, nor are they born into politics. And, of
course, they have lives that exist outside of politics.
Moreover, a biography is not only a life-story in the sense
that it covers a life, it is also a life-story in the sense that it unfolds
itself with the life of the individual described. It's a "history with
a subject" in the narrowest sense of the word. The question is: can
this subject be maintained writing a political biography? I don't
think so. While writing a political biography one faces a clear
choice: either one writes from the point of view of the individual
involved, or one writes from the perspective of the political
structures in which he or she is embedded.
In the first case a true biography might be the result. In the
second all one can hope for is a political analysis of an individual
life. In both cases, however, it is the interrelationship between
politics and the individual that matters. Therefore, both can claim
to be political biographies.
In the fust case, however, the individual is either the
subject or the object of politics. He or she can not be both, because
there is no life from this perspective. Being both a subject and an
object of politics does not allow for any action. It leads to a
contemplative attitude toward politics: that's all. And there is no
sense in writing a political biography of someone in the role of an
eternal onlooker.
However, reducing a person to either the role of a subject
of politics or an object of politics means one has to give him or her
all the credit in politics or none at all. There is no in-between. So
the biographer has to choose between a history in which the
subject figures as the center of all politics and one in which he or
she falls victim to politics. Of course one might combine them in
the sense that they run parallel or alternately. But they cannot be
integrated. So, in the end, one has a "great man" history in which
the person involved is presented as the mainspring of politics and
a plot in which he falls victim to political forces beyond him or her.
The two together will result in the typical story of the good guys
and the bad guys in which the good guys are on the side of the hero
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and participate in his successes, while the bad guys are on the other
side, causing his failures. "Great man" history and conspiracy
theory are but two sides of the same coin.
From the perspective of politics, however, the individual
can and should be conceived as both the subject and the object of
politics. At one at the same time the person can be seen as the
originator and as the victim of politics. The individual involved
can be granted the initiative and shown to be manipulated at one
and the same time. This perspective allows a degree ofrelativity
that a subjective point of view would never permit, and creates the
possibility of really weighing someone's influence and of really
establishing his or her meaning for the politics he or she is
involved in. However, it does not allow for a complete picture of
his or her personality. Because one is only interested in the person
in so far as his or her activities are political or are of political significance, one may miss vital elements of his or her character. So
in this case the biographer will not be able to identify the person
under study. One might be able to ascribe some peculiar personal
qualities to the individual involved, but no more. No "complete"
picture can result. So from the perspective of politics one will not
be able to learn and know a person, but one might trace his or her
political and historical relevance.
The political biography as such is bound to miss this point.
It turns the world upside down by asking what is the meaning of
politics for one or another person instead of asking what is the
significance of this person for politics. In the end the biography
in the aforementioned sense is merely a legitimation of politics as
such. It makes politics look like a legitimate business. This seems
to be the main function of the political biography in the traditional
sense.
So when one is primarily interested in politics one should
not simply obey the reigning laws regarding the writing of a
biography. This has important consequences. For a "political"
political biography cannot hold the story line. There is no
unfolding of the subject. Instead there is an adjustment of a given
subject to changing political circumstances. The change described is primarily a change of political structures, not a change
of the individual involved. Thus the rhythm of change is prescribed by the rhythm in which structural change is perceived.
And the perception of structural change goes by jumps. From the
view point of the individual it goes like this: suddenly one finds
oneself in a situation in which one feels obliged to reconsider
one's position. The relationship with one's environment is not
what it was before. New problems have arisen, old solutions don't
fit anymore. A reconsideration of one's strategy is required. The
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evolving debate or struggle will assign the person involved a new
position within the social or political realm. His or her interests
are redefined. A new social and political identity is accepted. This
implies that a subject, a political subject, is taken from crisis to
crisis; from one strategic reconsideration to another. Time and
again his or her situation is disturbed by a political intervention
from one side or another.
As a consequence of this dual perspective the political
biography will have a fragmented character. Every time there is
a change of perspective the story-line will be broken. The political
biography is built on episodes. The historiography develops as an
ongoing sequence of strategic reconsiderations. At a higher level
this multitude of changes within the political realm presents itself
as a change of politics itself.
The fragmentary method is a means to describe a tendency; an ongoing, but disrupted, sequence of changes. At the end
of it lies a definite change in political structure and a new
definition of the national interest. In our terminology: a new
concept of control has gained dominance. A consequence of this
fragmentary presentation of political life is that the political
biography will have to be a compilation of mini-stories. It will not
be sliding through history, but will jump from one political event
and one strategic reconsideration to another. Therefore it cannot
be purely chronological. Different considerations can go on at the
same time, each with their own point of departure and following
their own course of events. Therefore the political biographer will
have to jump through history like a horse on a chess board, but
somehow without loosing his or her sense of direction.

II
Now let us see how the story jumps in our case . The historiography starts around 1860, almost forty years before Hirschfeld's
birth, because that is where we find the first constant in his
political career: the striving to bring and to keep different kinds
and sources of capital together on a private base but with a
common, a social goal in mind. It was around this time that the
Credit Mobilier was introduced into The Netherlands. Coming
from France, this new form of capital acquisition made way for the
so-called investment bank; a new form of granting credits that
would link the banks with the other branches of the economy,
including industry, trade, traffic, merchant shipping and colonial
enterprise.
However, it was not until the eve of Hirschfeld's career
that one could begin to speak of a structural relation between
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Dutch banking on the one side and the other sectors of the national
economy on the other. Hirschfeld, who made this development
the subject of his dissertation, saw the bankers as being in the very
center of the national economy. In making them responsible for
the economy as a whole he subscribed to an idea developed by the
French philosopher Comte Henri de Saint-Simon ( 1789-1823) .
He thought the bankers should be given the lead in developing the
productive capacity of the country because they were in the
position to place capital with the most significant producers. In
line with this Hirschfeld saw the bankers, that is to say the banking
community as it gathered around the central bank, as the players
most suited to formulate a national economic policy. This was
because the bankers had a vested interest in the economy as such;
here private and general interest met. Credit was considered the
instrument to keep the economy going and in balance. By
directing and rationing it the banking community would be able
to dampen economic undulations and prevent the development of
social and political crises. By the end of World War I society was
desperately in need of such a capacity if it was not to fall.victim
to the anti-capitalistic forces that were threatening Europe.
Hirschfeld, being a banker by profession and by zeal, was
quite surprised when he was asked to come and join the administration in 1931. By then the economic world crisis already had
The Netherlands in its grips. It was already clear that the bankers
alone would not be able to cope with this crisis. Credit, as such,
was in jeopardy. Of the other branches of the economy, agriculture in particular was hit very hard, but Dutch shipping had also
felt a severe blow. And as private credit institutions stepped back
it became all the more clear that the state should intervene to
rescue the nation's productive capacity . If not, the country would
face serious social and political upheavals.
When Hirschfeld joined the struggle the government
aimed not only at protecting the country's productive capacity but
also its monetary stability. The first to fall victim to this twin aim
was the wish to uphold internal monetary stability. By following
a policy of deflation and trade restrictions the government hoped
to stop the fall in employment and keep the guilder tied to the gold
standard. Hirschfeld, who was in charge of the negotiations with
The Netherlands' two most important trading partners, Germany
and the United Kingdom, had a hard time balancing the different
kind of interests involved.
The government's policy, however, was not sufficient to
keep employment from falling. Thereupon the binding of the
Dutch guilder to the gold standard came under attack . Hirschfeld
and his minister held the attempt to preserve monetary stability re140

sponsible for the lack of international competitive power. The
Prime Minister, however, did not give in. It was only in 1936,
when The Netherlands was becoming the sole surviving member
of the gold block, that a devaluation was accepted . Of the Holy
Monetary Trinity that had reigned in the 1920s one target remained: the balancing of the budget. However, this too was
gradually undermined. The pursuit of a more active economic and
social policy, along with the expansion of the state-apparatus that
went with it, made this target attainable only by some creative
bookkeeping. The final blow came in 1939, when the Prime
Minister and his Minister of Finance were not able to withstand
the joined forces of the Department of Economics and Social
Affairs and were forced to make way for a policy in which the
balancing of the budget was only one target among others. This
implied the end of the hegemony of the liberal-oriented Depart ment of Finance and the emancipation of Hirschfeld's own
Department of Economics in collusion with the Department of
Social Affairs . The attempt to keep up national production had
now reached equal status with the goal of monetary stability.
The road for a new policy was open. But war intervened.
Instead of a search for a new policy, a period of sheer survival set
in. By balancing the interests of Germany and the United
Kingdom the country tried to remain neutral. It was Hirschfeld' s
task to find a modus vivendi with these two warring nations, now
mutually exclusive trading partners. This approach ended when
the German war machine overran The Netherlands in May 1940 .
Priorities changed again. In the first instance the idea was to
accept the change of circumstances and to go for an AngloGerman arrangement which would settle German hegemony on
the European continent. From 1942 onwards, however, it became
clear the war would be fought until the very end, until the
destruction of one of the adversaries, most likely Germany .
Thereafter sheer survival dominated the policy of the civil servants who had stayed behind in The Hague. Sheer survival for
Hirschfeld meant not only personal survival, but also the preservation of the economy and the maintenance of the state-apparatus .
Preserving the economy was equivalent to keeping up
production . The maintenance of the national income soon proved
to be an illusion. German policy amounted to forced deliveries
and created an enormous debt in German Reichsmarks. Keeping
up production in the eyes of Hirschfeld was equal to keeping up
society as such. For without production starvation would set in,
and without the binding of the workers to the producers society
would disintegrate . Preservation of the state-apparatus not only
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meant having an instrument with which to defend the Dutch
national interest, albeit in a rudimentary way, but also to preserve
an apparatus to take care of the country once the war was over.
To be able to fill the power vacuum, then, was essential for
social and political continuity. A prerequisite was that the
apparatus should not fall into the hands of Dutch national socialists. In this Hirschfeld succeeded rather well, although he had to
engage in a risky confrontation with one of the most prominent
Dutch Nazis who had become head of the Department of Finance
and head of the Central Bank as well. Personal survival meant not
only avoiding acts of war and not provoking the German adversaries; it also meant staying out of the hands of the resistance
movement, which had built up a great deal ofresentment against
the leading Dutch officials. And towards the end of the war and
immediately thereafter it also meant being ready for a defense and
a rendering of responsibility for the policies pursued. In all these
things Hirschfeld proved to be successful, although with some
narrow escapes. His aforementioned rehabilitation is there to
confirm it.
With Hirschfeld on the sidelines in 1945 the recovery was
set in motion. In the second part of 1946, however, it became clear
that the recovery would be halted by a failure to restore economic
relations with occupied Germany and the rebellious Netherlands
East Indies.
From an economic point of view the country was in need
of a strong and revived Germany. From a political and military
perspective, however, a weak and divided Germany was preferred. The solution Hirschfeld presented was twofold: as far as
the German internal political structure was concerned he pleaded
for a confederation rather than a federation. Political centralization should be inversely related to economic strength. The second
and most important part of his proposition was European economic cooperation. German trade and price policies should be put
on a European base. No more dumping should be allowed. The
Dutch government adopted this view. Thereafter Hirschfeld was
among those who went to London to defend the Dutch position in
face of the Big Four: the United States, the Soviet Union, Great
Britain, and France. The four powers, however, showed hardly
any interest. Inside The Netherlands Hirschfeld's ideas initially
met strong opposition from representatives of all sectors of the
economy, except banking. The bankers were the only ones to
applaud the European approach. But by spring of 1947, as it
became clear that a simple return to prewar bilateral relations was
impossible, Hirschfeld' s approach became the truly national one.
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About this time Hirschfeld was also consulted on Indonesian affairs. In April the Indies proved to be heading for a severe
balance of payments crisis. This was a very serious threat indeed,
as the motherland herself was also coping with severe difficulties
in international payments. A loss of the colony would mean a fatal
blow to her own credit-wonhiness. Hirschfeld was well aware of
the fact that only an American loan could help. But before
negotiations could stan economic prospects in the Indies needed
to be improved. An economic and financial agreement with the
rebellious Republic seemed mandatory. To see whether this was
possible a ministerial delegation left for Batavia, with Hirschfeld
aoing along as an adviser. He soon concluded that there was no
~hance of an understanding and advised military action.
The government, however, was facing a serious problem:
in The Netherlands nobody was prepared for such a twist of
policy. Financial problems were kept secret and now time was
needed to prepare public opinion. Also, it remained to be seen
whether the allies would accept military intervention. Hirschfeld
left for London and Washington, where he got the impression that
there was some room for the military approach. It got underway
by July 22. Militarily and economically the war was a success. A
large quantity of goods waiting for export were confiscated. The
Netherlands' financial prospects, however, hardly improved as
guerrilla warfare developed. Many, Hirschfeld included, now
wanted to do away with the political strongholds of the Republic
as well. They were even prepared to challenge the United Nations,
which had called for a cease-fire. By the end of August, Hirschfeld,
depressed by the course of events in Europe as well, even went so
far as to advise the risk of an open confrontation with the United
States and Great Britain. At least then, he argued, the Dutch
people would have someone other than their own government to
blame if the colony had to be abandoned. Political stability was
always on his mind. The government, however, decided not to
take the chance, and hostilities were stopped.
Shonly thereafter a new perspective gained momentum.
From Paris, Hirschfeld could repon that the first Conference on
European Economic Cooperation was heading for a successful
conclusion. That summer, 16 countries had been busy formulating an answer to the American offer in June to come and rescue
them from a severe shortage of foreign currency in exchange for
mutual cooperation and a strong production effon. Hirschfeld
attended the conference on behalf of the Benelux, the unit of
cooperation of Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. As
a member of the five-man executive committee he exened considerable influence, acting as a broker between the ideas developed
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in Europe and those being worked out in Washington. His main
adversaries were the French, who were striving for a permanently
weakened Germany, while The Netherlands was looking for a
revived and integrated Germany. For the first time since the war
some consideration was given to Dutch ideas. Hirschfeld also
collided with the French on the kind of cooperation the Europeans
should be looking for. The Benelux, although a customs union
itself, opted for a monetary approach. The French were looking
for an attack on intra-European trade barriers. The Hague,
however, feared French dominance resulting from a European
customs union. Initially, Paris was supported by the United
States, but as ideas crystallized and the State Department took the
lead, support for the French withered away.
Success, however, loomed far away. The amount of help
Europe was asking for made the Americans stagger. To Hirschfeld
this came as no surprise; right from the start he had been warning
that by simply casting up European needs one would come up with
an unworkable result. Ultimately the conference was in danger of
a collapse on this British/French approach. Due to a last minute
intervention of Hirschfeld, who declared the Benelux would not
go for a result which didn't satisfy the United States, Paris and
London gave in. In the end the conference could present a
preliminary report that the American administration felt able to go
along with. In October Hirschfeld was among those who visited
Washington to help the American administration prepare for its
coming confrontation with Congress.
Meanwhile, European cooperation and American willingness to help-options Hirschfeld had been looking for in his
dealings with the German and the Indonesian problem-had
become serious prospects indeed. That is not to say anything had
been solved yet; far from that. By the end of 1947 The Netherlands
were still heading for a severe crisis of its balance of payments.
To prevent bankruptcy, the Minister of Finance wanted
Hirschfeld to go and ask for interim help from Washington.
Hirschfeld refused. It would be of no avail: The Netherlands
economy would not come to a standstill until the summer of 1948
and the Americans had made it very clear that they were prepared
to help on a bilateral basis only in case of starvation that very same
winter. Things were bad, but not as bad as that. The only way out
was to further European cooperation and to come to terms with the
Indonesian rebels. This was the course Hirschfeld pleaded for in
the beginning of 1948.
Cooperation with Belgium, in which Hirschfeld had taken
the lead, now came to the forefront. In 1948 it started to open up
the big power talks on the future of Germany. At the same time
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it went on to strengthen the Dutch position within the OEEC and
vis-a-vis the United States as well. In Washington the Benelux
customs union was held in high esteem as being a first substantial
step towards European cooperation; the Belgians and the Dutch
were seen as the vanguard. Cooperation with Belgium was also
important because Brussels acted as the country's most ardent
supporter with regard to policies towards Indonesia. Besides that,
the goal of economic union was a powerful force in the
government's striving for economic liberalization and monetary
stability. In exchange for foreign currency support and a leveling
of trade barriers, the Belgians were asking The Netherlands to do
away with its war-time policies of rationing and subsidization. In
doing so they were supporting the Dutch government in its efforts
to say farewell to the wartime economy. With so many virtues
coming together, cooperation with the Belgians rose to the utmost
importance. Hirschfeld, who had taken the lead in urging the
creation of an economic union by 1950, grew to the height of his
influence, both nationally and internationally.
From the summer of 1948 onwards, one could say that
Hirschfeld did represent the Dutch interest as such. As "Mr.
Benelux" and the first in line with regard to Dutch policy towards
the Marshall Plan he became responsible for the coherence of
government policy. Thanks to his tactical skills The Netherlands
received a vast amount of American aid and continued to exercise
a great deal of influence on European cooperation issues. It also
obtained a position of strength with regards to Western policies
towards Germany. The latter did not last very long, however, as
the German problem developed into a superpower contest. Internally, Hirschfeld exerted a vast influence on the spending of the
Marshall aid in particular and on the monetary policies that went
with it. He played a crucial role in coordinating the conflicting
policies of the Departments of Finance and of Economics. He
prevented inter-departmental strife from becoming a political
problem and endangering the existing governmental coalition.
The only essential pan of Dutch policy that escaped his
permanent influence was the policy towards the Indonesian
Republic. Catholic politicians maneuvered the country into a
second military operation, an adventure which by the end of 1948
had almost fatal consequences: not only was American aid to The
Netherlands' East Indies suspended, but Marshall aid to The
Netherlands became endangered as well. The Netherlands'
political isolation became so severe that even the Belgians began
to reconsider their position. Now Hirschfeld started to intervene
on behalf of Indonesian independence . In his view the colonial
approach was harming vital Dutch interests, and, in any event, The
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Netherlands' economic and financial position within the new state
would be so strong as to guarantee a continuing influence .
Hirschfeld, backed by American power, proved to have a
very strong case indeed. From the spring of 1949 on The
Netherlands government started to work towards a transfer of
sovereignty. Around this time it also became clear that European
cooperation was a dead end; as a consequence Benelux cooperation came under pressure again. At first Hirschfeld's attempt to
create an economic union was saved by the decision to go for a
"pre-union" by September 1949 and to postpone the economic
union until the summer of 1950. But as European cooperation
faltered, in particular because of Britain's refusal to give up its
special position between Europe and the United States and its
unwillingness to cut its ties with the Commonwealth, the interests
of the Belgians and the Dutch diverged even further. Hirschfeld
was hoping the Americans would intervene and revive European
cooperation by putting Great Britain in its proper European place.
Nothing like that happened.
Meanwhile, Dutch prospects also worsened because of a
deadlock in the Indonesian negotiations . To save the Dutch
balance of payments from another collapse, Hirschfeld in the end
pleaded for an American -inspired "big leap forward" in European
cooperation and for an internationalization of his own function.
The latter would imply a transfer of essential Dutch sovereignty
into the hands of some sort of European agency. Internal coordination would then become an international affair.
With the deadlock almost complete and nobody there to
offer even the glimpse of a solution, prospects suddenly started to
change. In the beginning of September American policy with
regard to Germany took a sharp turn, resulting overnight in the
almost complete liberalization of Dutch trade with Western Germany. This "miracle" was followed by the devaluation of the
English pound towards the dollar. The Dutch guilder followed
suit. By the end of October the long-awaited American initiative
to accelerate European cooperation followed. The special position of Britain was accepted and European cooperation was led on
a two-track lane; a monetary one which would include Britain, and
one oriented towards dismantling trade barriers, which would be
confined to the continent. At about the same time the Dutch
negotiations with Indonesia were concluded successfully, with an
agreement that independence would be granted by the beginning
of 1950.
All of this made it clear that the parameters of Dutch
foreign policy had been completely changed within a period of
two months. Now there was room for cooperation with Belgium
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once again, while the need for an economic union was lessened as
new and other prospects for European cooperation had appeared.
Soon thereafter Hirschfeld, together with the president of The
Netherlands Bank, figured out that The Netherlands should stop
considering the English pound, which had been severely weakened, as the leading European currency. This implied a turn
towards the dollar as the leading European currency and to the
European continent as the main framework for cooperation, at
least once Germany was allowed to take its proper European
place. Without Germany, of course, cooperation would lose its
attractiveness, since it would imply subordination to the French.
For the moment prospects still looked grim as the French seemed
not to be inclined to give in on this point. Yet by the end of the year
the future looked bright. A surplus in the Dutch balance of
payments suddenly seemed to be within reach. The promotion of
exports now became the most rewarding strategy, taking the place
of economic union with Belgium as The Netherlands' foremost
policy target.
In November, Hirschfeld had been asked to go to Djakarta
to help Indonesian-Dutch relations through the first months of
independence . He refused. In December the plea was repeated.
This time Hirschfeld did agree. He did not want the government
to lose face, and besides he now had an idea of what to go and do
in Indonesia: develop relations along the lines dictated by Dutch
export policies. In the short run this meant creating anew platform
for bilateral relations and helping the Indonesian government to
establish itself.
This soon proved to be asking far too much. The Dutch
legacy, laid down in the federal concept of the United States of
Indonesia and still omnipresent in the Royal Netherlands East
Indies Army, proved to be a very unsettling factor. All Hirschfeld
could do was to save relations from a complete breakdown. In the
end, after a hectic eight months, he had made hardly any progress
in fostering economic and financial relations. Dutch credit had
been granted, and some trade arrangements had been made, but
nothing systematic had been accomplished. Yet Hirschfeld was
widely praised for having prevented an all-out disaster. He
himself was not quite so satisfied, as he had not been able to
convince the Dutch government of the neea to give way to the
development of good relations with the Indonesian government,
for example by showing a readiness to transfer power over The
Netherlands New Guineas as well. The Hague cherished its
physical and military presence in the region, whereas Hirschfeld
thought economic and financial power would do.
Coming back to The Hague, Hirschfeld found the govern147

ment in disarray again. As Hirschfeld himself had been able to see
from Indonesia, the new export policy had failed to provide an
answer to the many problems facing the government. The final
blow to the export policy came with the sudden boom in world
market prices that followed the outbreak of the Korean war.
Progress in European economic and monetary cooperation, which
had resulted in a European Payments Union and in an outlay for
a common market for coal, iron, and steel, had come to a standstill
again. When Hirschfeld came home he was confronted with a
chaotic situation which demanded new ways of coordinating
economic, financial, social, and military policies.
Amidst the emerging crisis, Hirschfeld collapsed from a
heart attack. During his illness, responsibilities for the policies
with regard to American economic and military aid were combined in a new Governmental Commissionership, and the coordinating role Hirschfeld had been performing since 1947 was
handed over to the chairman of a new council of government
advisers. Hirschfeld was expected to accept both functions upon
his return from sick-leave. When this happened, in May 1951, the
struggle over a new overall policy target was already in full swing.
Confronting each other were those who wanted to give priority to
monetary stability and those who wanted to give way to full
employment. For the moment, however, priority was given to
political stability. This meant precedence was given to a restoration of the balance of payments, which showed a huge deficit
again. This compromise did combine a mild inflation with a
moderate amount of unemployment, but when the latter did not
improve well enough and the balance of payments took a sharp
turn for the better the struggle between monetarists and productionists started all over again . This time the dispute was whether
to give priority to full employment or to continue to compromise
and give the lead to exports. The decision was postponed until
after the June 1952 elections, when the productionist wing,
represented by the social-democrats and the trade-unionist Catholics took a clear lead over the monetarists, most notably represented by the right wing of the Catholics and the liberals.
As a consequence, Hirschfeld quit. He had been working
on the premise that these countervailing powers could and should
be balanced. Now that one had the upper hand he was outplayed .
At the same time, this result proved him to be on the side of the
monetarists. He had been working on their line of defense.
Hirschfeld now returned to banking. As a matter of fact, ever since
1947 he had been a commissioner with the Rotterdam Bank; one
might say he never had stopped being a banker at all.
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The year 1952 proved to be a watershed for The Netherlands.
After this a long period of stability and prosperity set in, leaving
the years of depression, war, and slow recovery far behind. In
retrospect Hirschfeld proved to be a functionary of the period of
transition leading the country from a time in which the soiving for
monetary stability and global neutrality were central to a time in
which the securing of full employment and the strategic approach
towards European and Atlantic cooperation came to the foreground. It was a period in which the definition of the national
interest changed from a desire for stable growth of national
income to a desire for stable growth of the national product.
Before 1931, more weight was given to international trade,
shipping, and investment than to industry and agriculture. From
1952 onwards the productive sectors got the upper hand.
In between, a miraculous juggling of interests took place
with no one or no combination in a position to hold or take the lead.
It was Hirschfeld's passionate view that preventing such a choice
was the best option for political and economic stability. It was his
job to look for a common denominator, instead of forcing one way
or the other. He was the crisis-manager avant la lettre. When his
way of handling affairs ceased to be a guarantee for social and
political order he returned to private banking. In this he was a
practical man. He never sought to go beyond the possible, which
meant that by necessity he went for the existing. In this sense he
was a conservative. But this does not mean Hirschfeld adored the
status quo. As reality was a dynamic affair there was no sense in
preventing change. Hirschfeld, instead, sought merely to control
that change.
By now it should be clear that, for the political scientist,
writing a political biography might be very rewarding provided
due respect is paid to the selection of the person involved and the
period described. These strategic considerations should even go
as far as to determine the point of view from which one writes. All
three of these issues are of critical importance. In this respect the
traditional political biography is very limited in scope. While the
"political" political biography can combine a wide range of topics
with an ability to explore the essence of politics in depths, the
traditional biography is bound to be limited to an ordering and
systematization of a point of view that will be completely outdated. Only the former has the potential to deliver a vivid account
of what politics is all about.
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